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Abstract This paper attempts to show how the logical empiricists’ interpretation
of the relation between geometry and reality emerges from a ‘‘collision’’ of math-
ematical traditions. Considering Riemann’s work as the initiator of a 19th century
geometrical tradition, whose main protagonists were Helmholtz and Poincare´, the
logical empiricists neglected the fact that Riemann’s revolutionary insight flour-
ished instead in a non-geometrical tradition dominated by the works of Christoffel
and Ricci-Curbastro roughly in the same years. I will argue that, in the attempt to
interpret general relativity as the last link of the chain Riemann–Helmholtz–Poin-
care´–Einstein, logical empiricists were led to argue that Einstein’s theory of grav-
itation mainly raised a problem of mathematical under-determination, i.e. the
discovery that there are physical differences that cannot be expressed in the relevant
mathematical structure of the theory. However, a historical reconstruction of the
alternative Riemann–Christoffel–Ricci–Einstein line of evolution shows on the
contrary that the main philosophical issue raised by Einstein’s theory was instead
that of mathematical over-determination, i.e. the recognition of the presence of
redundant mathematical differences that do not have any correspondence in physical
reality.
1 Introduction
In the logical empiricists’ philosophy of space and time, Einstein’s conception of
the relations between ‘‘geometry and experience’’ appears to be the heir of a 19th
century philosophical and scientific tradition, the main protagonists of which were
Riemann, Helmholtz, and Poincare´. The result of such a tradition appears to have
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come out most clearly in Reichenbach’s celebrated theory of ‘‘equivalent
descriptions’’. Riemann, Helmholtz, and Poincare´ discovered the ‘‘principle of the
relativity of geometry’’: we are free to choose among different metric geometries
inasmuch as they can be transformed into one another by unique and continuous
transformations, that is, insofar as as they are, in the Logical Empiricists’ parlance,
‘‘topologically equivalent’’.
It is probably Michael Friedman who has most convincingly shown that such a
tradition simply never existed (Friedman 1995). Helmholtz’s and Poincare´’s
philosophy of geometry presupposes homogenous spaces, which can be covered by
congruent tiles without gaps and overlappings. In such geometries there is a unique
set of congruence relations, on which all observer can agree, or, more technically, a
group of self-mappings with the properties of rigid motions can be defined.
Riemann, on the contrary, left open the possibility of highly non-uniform spaces,
where no group of motions can be defined and thus no unique conventional
agreement can be made as to which tiles are congruent.
Logical empiricists were of course aware of the elementary fact that there are no
rigid bodies in spaces of variable curvature. However, by stripping Helmholtz’s and
Poincare´’s philosophy of geometry from their group-theoretical implications
(Friedman 1995), they believed it was possible to simply shift the attention from
‘‘finite rigid bodies’’ to ‘‘infinitesimal rigid rods’’. As Roberto Torretti has shown,
however, this strategy is hardly compatible with conventionalism. In a Riemannian
manifold, an infinitesimal rod is considered rigid as long as it has a Euclidean
behavior; one does not set by convention which rods are rigid, but instead checks it
under the hypothesis that the space is Euclidean in its smallest parts (Torretti 1983,
235ff.).
In the Riemannian geometry adopted in general relativity, once a unit of measure
has been arbitrarily fixed, the length of an infinitesimal measuring rod turns out to
possess an absolute value, so that two intervals at a finite distance can be
immediately compared. Einstein, it is true, refers, rather sporadically, to Helmholtz
and Poincare´ in his writings on the philosophy of geometry (Friedman 2002).
However, Einstein’s reference should be understood instead in the context of the so-
called ‘‘measuring rod objection’’ against Hermann Weyl’s attempt at unifying
electricity and gravitation by dropping the length comparison ‘‘at-distance’’, rather
then as a defense of conventionalism (Fogel 2008, ch. 3 and 4; Giovanelli 2012).
Thus it has been abundantly shown that the logical empiricists’ attempt to read
Einstein’s general theory as the heir of a geometrical tradition, that starting with
Riemann was developed into the epistemological works of Helmholtz and Poincare´,
was substantially flawed. In my opinion, however, an even simpler historical point
has escaped recent historical literature. Significantly, the logical empiricists were
unable to philosophically appreciate the fact that Riemann’s work, during roughly
the same years, was mainly developed in a non-geometrical tradition in the work of
authors such as Elwin Bruno Christoffel and Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro, the father of
the so-called ‘‘absolute differential calculus’’ (our tensor calculus). Of course,
Einstein himself explicitly considered general relativity as the direct heir of this
tradition, or, as he famously put it, ‘‘a real triumph of the method of the general
differential calculus’’ (Einstein 1915d, 778).
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Riemann’s work, considered from the point of view of Helmholtz’s and
Poincare´’s philosophical reflections on geometry, appeared to the Logical Empir-
icist as concerned with the question of choosing between alternative physical
geometries. Interpreted in the light of Christoffel’s and Ricci-Curbastro’s work,
Riemann’s main concern appears to be that of discerning the objective geometrical
properties of the same physical geometry—those that are independent of the
particular coordinate system we choose—from those properties that are a mere
artifact of the coordinate system used.
As far I can see, the names of Christoffel and Ricci are not even mentioned by the
logical empiricists. I would like to venture that this may at least partially have to do
with the fact that they never intervened in the philosophical debate on the
foundation of geometry. In order to show that some quantity has geometrical
substance and is not just an artifact of some arbitrary choice of coordinates, they
invoked the abstract study of the law of transformation of the quadratic differential
forms. However, it is only from this point of view that the mathematical apparatus
of Riemannian geometry and most of all its role in general relativity—in the form of
the requirement of ‘‘general covariance’’—can be understood.
The aim of this paper is to show that the inadequacy (Friedman, 1983; Nerlich
1994; Ryckman 2007, 2008) of the Logical Empiricists’ interpretation of general
relativity is in many respects the consequence of their failure to recognize the
philosophical significance of this mathematical tradition. Logical Empiricists tried
to interpret the role of Riemannian geometry in Einstein’s general relativity through
the lenses of the epistemological problems raised by Helmholtz and Poincare´.
Historically and systematically, however, Riemann’s revolutionary approach
became part of Einstein’s theory of gravitation through the mediation of the
analytical work of Christoffel and Ricci.
After a brief description of how Riemann’s insight was developed analytically
(mainly, even if, of course, not solely) by Christoffel and later by Ricci in the so-
called ‘‘absolute differential calculus’’ (Sect. 2), and then implemented in the
general theory of relativity (Sect. 3), this paper concentrates on Reichenbach’s
famous ‘‘conversion’’ to conventionalism (Sect. 4) and on the emergence of the
standard logical empiricist interpretation of the relation between geometry and
physics (Sect. 6).
Even if the main claim of the paper could be extended to Logical Empiricists in
general, Reichenbach’s position appears particularly significant and will be treated
as a sort of case study. Reichenbach’s insistence on the ‘‘relativity of coordinates’’
in his first ‘‘Kantian’’ monograph (Reichenbach 1920b) appears to be much more
effective in hindsight than his later appeal to the ‘‘relativity of geometry’’
(Reichenbach 1928). Reichenbach’s deep knowledge of the mathematical apparatus
of general relativity shows that this change of position was not the consequence of a
trivial ‘‘blunder’’, but the conscious pursuit of a philosophical program. The
philosophical inadequacy of his reading emerges paradoxically by following the
more expository/semi-technical parts his work, rather than concentrating on his
philosophical interpretation.
Recent historically-oriented philosophy of science has insisted on the importance
of the 19th century debate about the foundation of geometry in order to understand
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the emergence of Logical Empiricism and, in particular, of its interpretation of the
Theory of Relativity (Ryckman 1992; Coffa 1991; Friedman 1999; Howard 1994;
Friedman 2008, only to mention some titles). However, in my opinion, even well-
informed and influential works (see of instance DiSalle 2006) have not given
sufficient attention to the implicit philosophical significance of the development of
Riemann’s ideas in the work of Christoffel and Ricci. This investigation was
therefore left exclusively to the history of mathematics (see for instance the classical
Reich 1994), rather than being considered a part of the ‘‘synthetic’’ history (Dickson
and Domski 2010) that eventually led to the emergence of modern philosophy of
science.
The filling of this lacuna in the historical literature on Logical Empiricism could
help to clarify a more general philosophical misunderstanding, which seems to
characterize early philosophical interpretations of general relativity (cf. Ryckman
2008, for an overview). General relativity, considered as the heir to the 19th century
conventionalism of Helmholtz and Poincare´, seemed to raise a problem of
mathematical under-determination; it shows the existence of mathematically
equivalent, but different physical geometries, among which we can only make a
pragmatic choice. Considered as the heir to the work of Riemann, Christoffel, and
Ricci, general relativity appears to mainly raise a problem of mathematical over-
determination; it shows that it is possible to represent the same physical geometry in
different coordinate systems, using different mathematical functions. General
Relativity shows the existence of a ‘‘redundancy’’ in the mathematical description,
rather than ‘‘reducing’’ the mathematical structure that is physically relevant (Sect. 7)
2 Riemann’s ‘‘A¨quivalenzproblem’’ and its Analytical Development
in the Work of Christoffel and Ricci-Curbastro
2.1 Riemann: From the Habilitationsvortrag to the Commentatio Mathematica
On June 10, 1854, before the Philosophical Faculty at Go¨ttingen, Riemann delivered
his celebrated Habilitationsvortrag, Ueber die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie
zu Grunde liegen. This short address would turn out to be one of the most influential
(even if only partially understood) papers in the second half of the nineteenth
century.
Riemann famously considered space as a special case of ‘‘n-dimensioned
manifoldness’’ (Riemann 1868, 138; tr. Riemann 1873; cf. Scholz 1982), expressed
by means of ‘‘n variables x1, x2, x3, …, xn’’ (Riemann 1868, 139; tr. 1873, 15).
Inspired by Gauss’s theory of curved surfaces (Gauss 1827), Riemann assumed as a
hypothesis (as the simplest among other possible alternatives) that space is
distinguished from other ‘‘manifoldnesses’’ by the fact that the so-called line
element ds, ‘‘is the square root of an always positive integrable homogeneous
function of the second order of the quantities dx, in which the coefficients are
continuous functions of’’ the quantities x’’ (Riemann 1868, 140; tr. 1873, 15; cf.
Libois 1957; Scholz 1992). As is well known, Riemann’s abstract approach turned
out to be extremely powerful, allowing an infinity of possible geometries. Different
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geometries correspond to different expressions for the line element represented by
different sets of coefficients.
The opposite, however, is not necessarily true. Riemann observed that every such
expression can be transformed ‘‘into another similar one if we substitute for the
n independent variables functions of n new independent variables’’ (Riemann 1868,
140; tr. 1873, 16), x1, …, xn. The coefficients of the quadratic expression will
depend on the variable used, but it is possible to show how the coefficients
transform under a change of the independent variables in such a way as to make ds2
remain unchanged.
However, as Riemann immediately made clear, ‘‘we cannot transform any expression
into any other’’ (Riemann 1868, 140; tr. 1873, 16). The fact that a sphere cannot be
projected onto a plane without distortion can be expressed analytically by the fact that it
is impossible to convert the quadratic differential form, which holds on a sphere by
means of a mere transformation of the independent variables, to one ‘‘in which the square
of the line-element is expressed as the sum of the squares of complete differentials’’, that
is, to one ‘‘in which the line-element may be reduced to the form
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
P
dx2
p
’’ (Riemann
1868, 141, tr. 1873, 16; for more details Portnoy 1982; Zund 1983).
Different geometries are expressed analytically by different line elements, but the
difference in the appearance of the line element does not necessary imply a
geometrical difference. One of the main problems raised by Riemann’s inquiry was
discerning the geometrical properties that do not depend on a particular choice of
the independent variables from those that are a mere deceptive appearance
introduced by the mathematical formalism.
Riemann’s lecture, which was intended for an audience of non-mathematicians,
was intentionally scarce in the use of mathematical formulas. However, Riemann’s
somehow cryptic parlance is more familiar to the modern reader if one considers the
notation that he introduced in the so-called Commentatio mathematica (Riemann
1876, tr. in Farwell 1990). The paper was submitted to the Paris Academy in 1861 to
compete for a prize relating to the conduction of heat in homogeneous bodies with
constant conductivity coefficients. The prize was not assigned and the Commentatio
remained unknown until 1876, when Richard Dedekind—who found it in
Riemann’s Nachlaß—published it in the first edition of Riemann’s work.
In order to address the question posed by the academy, Riemann had to reduce a
system of partial differential equations to its simplest form. The problem turned out
to be equivalent to that of reducing a quadratic differential from
P
a0i;idxidx
0
i (where
a0i;i represent conductivity coefficients), to the form
P
dxi
2 with constant coefficients,
by a mere change of the independent variables xi (where i = 1, 2, 3) (Riemann
1876, 392, tr. Farwell 1990, 241). 1
Since it would be tedious to try various transformations of variables to establish
the possibility of such a reduction, Riemann wanted to find a general criterion of
transformability (cf. Farwell, 1990). For this purpose he introduced a four-index
symbol ðii0; i00i000Þ containing the first and the second partial derivatives of the
functions ai;i0 with respect to the xi. Then he showed that a quadratic differential
1 For sake of historical accuracy along the paper we will try to remain faithful to the original notations.
used by the various authors considered.
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form can be transformed into one with constant coefficients if the four-index symbol
vanishes: ðii0; i00i000Þ ¼ 0 (Riemann 1876, 402, tr. Farwell 1990, 242). Riemann
found a criterion for distinguishing between the case in which the non-constancy of
the conductivity coefficients ai,i’ is a mere appearance of the mathematical
description and the case in which it corresponds to a real physical difference, i.e. to
a thermally non-homogeneous body.
Riemann hints, although vaguely, at a geometrical interpretation of this
mathematical apparatus. The quadratic form
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
P0
i;i b
0
i;idsids
0
i
q
can be regarded as
the ‘‘line element in a more general space of n dimensions extending beyond the
bounds of our intuition’’ (Riemann 1876, 435, tr. Farwell, 1990, 252). A ‘‘flat
space’’ can be represented by a quadratic differential form, whose coefficients are
non-constant, such as polar coordinates or more complicated curvilinear coordi-
nates. This difference however does not have any geometrical meaning; in this case
it is always possible to find a transformation of variables with which the form
P
bi;i0dsidsi0 can be transformed into one with constant coefficients
P
i
ds2i
(Riemann 1876, 435, tr. Farwell 1990, 252). In a non-flat space, on the contrary,
such a transformation cannot be found.
The four-index symbol furnishes a precise mathematical criterion: if and only if it
vanishes the non-constancy of the coefficients is merely an artifact of the system of
variables used. If not, the non-constancy has, so to speak, geometrical substance.
Geometrically the four-index symbol corresponds to the ‘‘curvature … at the point
(s1, s2, …, sn)’’ (Riemann 1876, 435, tr. Farwell 1990, 252). In his 1854 lecture
Riemann had famously shown that this is not necessarily constant, opening the
possibility of spaces with variable curvature. Spaces of constant curvature are
merely a special case, where ‘‘independence of bodies from position’’ is assured
(Riemann 1868, 149; tr. 1873, 36).
The Commentatio seems to make clear, however, that Riemann’s main concern
was capable of being expressed in a purely analytical way—i.e. independently from
its possible physical or geometrical interpretation—as the problem of the
equivalence of differential quadratic forms. This problem, which is best known as
the A¨quivalenzproblem, exerted a profound influence on the later development of
mathematics and physics, as the development of absolute differential calculus
(Tonolo 1961; Struik 1993) as its implementation in Einstein’s theory of relativity
shows. In my opinion, however, this was not fully appreciated in the philosophical
debate raised by the appearance of Einstein’s theory of gravitation. The work of
Riemann, on the contrary, was read uncritically under the light of Helmholtz’s and
Poincare´’s philosophy of geometry, who, as we shall see, were concerned with quite
different philosophical questions.
2.2 A Very Brief History of the Emergence of the Absolute Differential
Calculus: Christoffel, Ricci and Levi-Civita
Riemann’s Habilitationsvortrag was discovered in the late 1860s by Richard
Dedekind, who had been entrusted with Riemann’s Nachlaß, and it was published in
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the ‘‘Abhandlungen der Ko¨niglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go¨ttin-
gen,’’ vol. 13, 1868 (Riemann 1868). Immediately afterward, Helmholtz, who had
known of the existence of Riemann’s paper in 1868 from Ernst Schering
(Koenigsberger 1906, II, 139), published his famous U¨ber die Tatsachen, die der
Geometrie zu Grunde liegen, which appeared a little later in the ‘‘Go¨ttinger gelehrte
Nachrichten,’’ vol. 15, 1868 (Helmholtz 1868).
Helmholtz famously derived Riemann’s hypothesis that metric relations are given
by a quadratic differential form (and not, for instance, by a quartic differential form)
from the fact that there are rigid bodies, whose translations and rotations—
expressed analytically by a set of differential equations—necessarily leaves a
quadratic differential form unchanged. As is well known, Helmholtz’s approach
based on the notion of rigid body was enormously successful in the history of the
philosophy of geometry.
As early as 1870, Helmholtz himself discussed the epistemological implications
in the less technical and widely read talk U¨ber den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der
geometrischen Axiome (Helmholtz 1883) and in other philosophical papers that
followed (Helmholtz 1878, 1879). In 1886, Sophus Lie (Lie 1886), stimulated by
Felix Klein, reinterpreted and corrected Helmholtz’s result on the basis of his theory
of continuous groups. In 1887, Henri Poincare´ (who already insisted on the group-
theoretical approach to the concept of rigid motion in the early 1880s; Poincare´
1882 § 2), referred to Lie’s results in his first paper on the foundations of geometry
(Poincare´ 1887, 214). At the end of the paper, Poincare´ hints at the ‘‘celebrated
Memoire of Riemann’’, in which every geometry is characterized ‘‘through the
expression of the arc element as a function of the coordinates’’ (Poincare´ 1887,
214). However, he discarded it as geometrically irrelevant, because it allows for
spaces which exclude ‘‘the existence of a group of motion which does not alter
distances’’ (Poincare´ 1887, 214, see also Poincare´ 1891, 773).
In general, Riemann’s speculations about variably curved spaces (with the
notorious exception of Clifford 1876) were either ignored or dismissed (Hawkins
1980, 2000). Instead, Riemann’s paper triggered developments in the non-
geometrical branch of mathematics concerned with the study of quadratic
differential forms. Dedekind had mentioned Riemann’s unpublished Habilitations-
vortrag to Erwin Bruno Christoffel, who in 1862 filled Dedekind’s post at ETH in
Zurich (Butzer 1981).
In the last paragraph of the paper published in 1869 in the ‘‘Journal fu¨r die reine
und angewandte Mathematik’’ (the celebrated Crelle’s Journal), U¨ber die Trans-
formation der homogenen Differentialausdru¨cke zweiten Grades (Christoffel 1869),
Christoffel in fact referred briefly to ‘‘an essay [Abhandlung] in Riemann’s
Nachlass to which Mr. Dedekind has announced to provide the missing analytical
elaborations’’ (Christoffel 1869, 70), which, of course, had already been published
(Riemann 1868)
Christoffel’s paper addressed the equivalence problem for two quadratic
differential forms in the most general way, without focusing on the special case
of the reducibility to an expression with constant coefficients (Ehlers 1981).
Christoffel wanted to establish which ‘‘conditions are necessary [erforderlich]’’
(Christoffel 1869, 46), for transforming a quadratic differential form F ¼Pxik#xi#xk
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into another such form F0 ¼Px0ik#x0i#x0k by means of a smooth, invertible
substitution of the independent variables. In order to answer this question, Christoffel
was led ‘‘for a better overview [zur besseren U¨bersicht]’’ (Christoffel 1869, 48) to
express the recurrent combination of the xik and their first partial derivatives
oxgk
oxh
through two kinds of three-index symbols
gh
k
 
and
il
r
 
¼P Erk
E
gh
k
 
2 (the now
famous Christoffel symbols respectively of first and second kind; Reich 1994; Herbert
1991).
The purely ‘‘algebraic’’ criterion for the equivalence of two differential forms is
then obtained by introducing a four-index symbol (ghki) that can be constructed
from the ‘‘Christoffel symbols’’ and their derivatives (that is, from the first and
second partial derivatives of the xik, Christoffel 1869, 54). It corresponds to
Riemann’s four-index symbol in the Commentatio (which Christoffel could not have
known). Two quadratic forms can be transformed into one another only if (locally)
ðghkiÞ ¼ ðghkiÞ0.
With the exception of a hint at the problem of the developable surfaces
(Christoffel 1869, 47), no reference to the geometrical concept of ‘‘curvature’’ can
be found in Christoffel’s paper, which follows a purely algorithmic approach. This
attitude was taken up by Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro, who in six papers published
between 1883–1888 was able to develop systematically Christoffel’s solution of the
A¨quivalenzproblem into a new calculus (Dell’Aglio, 1996; Bottazzini 1999). In his
first paper on the argument, Principii di una teoria delle forme differenziali
quadratiche (Ricci-Curbastro 1883), Ricci recognized his debts to Riemann (Ricci
could now refer to Riemann’s Commentatio), Rudolf Lipschitz (Lipschitz 1869) and
most of all Christoffel.
Like Christoffel, Ricci was not interested in making a contribution to geometry.
According to Ricci, ‘‘mathematicians have usually considered quadratic differential
forms … as representing line elements of n-dimensional spaces’’ (Ricci-Curbastro
1883, 140). This, however, has often led to confusion. Ricci explicitly emphasized
that his own investigations were based ‘‘on purely analytical concepts’’, leaving
aside ‘‘the rather vacuous [oziose] discussions about the existence of spaces more
than three dimensions’’ (Ricci-Curbastro 1883, 140).
Ricci’s goal was to develop a purely abstract theory of differential invariants, a
calculus of quadratic differential forms, such as ‘‘u ¼P
rs
arsdxrdxs where ars are
functions of x1, x2, …, xn.’’ (Ricci-Curbastro 1886, 3). The problem was then to
establish the laws according to which the coefficients would transform by a change
in the independent variables when ‘‘one substitutes the variables x1, x2, …, xn with
the variables u1, u2, …, un’’ (Ricci-Curbastro 1886, 4) (which are smooth functions
of the first ones) under the condition that u ¼ u0.
Ricci showed that the coefficients ars transform according to certain rules into the
new coefficients (apq), so that the new form is called ‘‘covariant’’ with respect to the
first; the reciprocal form a(rs) transformed ‘‘contravariantly’’ into a(pq) (Ricci-
2 where Erk
E
are the inverse matrix of xik
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Curbastro 1889, 113). Hence in Ricci’s parlance ars and a
(rs) form respectively a
covariant and contravariant ‘‘system’’ of second rank (because of the two indices).
To establish the conditions of tranformability, Ricci followed Christoffel’s path
of introducing the three index-symbol ars,i (for the Christoffel symbols of first kind),
and the four index-symbol ahi,jk which he later called ‘‘the system of Riemann’’
(Levi-Civita and Ricci-Curbastro 1900, 142). However, Ricci, beginning with his
1887 paper Delle Derivazioni covarianti e controvarianti e del loro uso nella analisi
applicata (Ricci-Curbastro 1888) interpreted Christoffel’s algorithms as a differ-
entiation of a more general kind that he labeled as ‘‘covariant (contravariant)
differentiation’’. (Ricci-Curbastro, 1888, 4). With the repeated application of the
covariant differentiation, starting from a covariant (or contravariant) primitive
system, others can be obtained (Ricci-Curbastro 1888, § 2).
This was the necessary step that allowed Ricci to transform Christoffel’s still
unsystematic approach into a new ‘‘calculus’’. In 1893, Ricci called it ‘‘absolute
differential calculus’’ for the first time, where the word ‘‘absolute’’ expresses the
fact that the calculus can be applied ‘‘independently of the choice of the independent
variables’’ and requires ‘‘that the latter are completely general and arbitrary’’
(Ricci-Curbastro 1893, 311). Ricci made his results known outside of Italy with a
summary published in French in Georges Darboux’s ‘‘Bulletin des Sciences
Mathe´matiques’’ in 1892 (Ricci-Curbastro 1892). Only in 1901, with the assistance
of his student Tullio Levi-Civita, did he publish a memoir in French, which can be
considered the manifesto of Ricci’s calculus, ‘‘Me´thodes de calcul diffe´rentiel
absolu et leurs applications’’ (finished in 1899) in Felix Klein’s journal,
‘‘Mathematische Annalen’’ in 1900 (Levi-Civita and Ricci-Curbastro, 1900).
3 ‘‘A Real Triumph of the Method of the General Differential Calculus’’:
Einstein’s General Relativity
Ricci’s calculus apparently failed to find his audience among differential geometers
(Roth 1942, 266; Reich 1994, 77, but see Bottazzini 1999). Ricci’s algorithms
appeared incapable of providing any substantially new geometrical results that
could not have been reached through a more traditional approach. This was what
Luigi Bianchi, author of a celebrated handbook on differential geometry (Bianchi
1894), meant when reviewing Ricci’s work for the royal prize of the Accademia dei
Lincei, by characterizing it as ‘‘useful but not indispensable’’ (Bianchi 1902, 149; on
the relations Bianchi-Ricci see Toscano 2001).
It is usually argued that only general relativity eventually did justice to Ricci’s
work. Einstein’s progressive appropriation of the work of Riemann, Christoffel,
Ricci, and Levi-Civita has of course been discussed several times in historical
literature (see for instance: Earman and Glymour 1978b; Stachel 2002; 1984;
Janssen and Renn 2007; Pais 1982, 212ff.). Here we will only give a superficial
presentation in order to emphasize some elements that will be relevant to
understanding the subsequent philosophical discussion. The secondary literature
listed below is of course far from being exhaustive and does not reflect priorities.
The Forgotten Tradition 1227
123
Author's personal copy
3.1 Einstein, Grossmann and the Absolute Differential Calculus
In 1907, Einstein put forward the principle of equivalence as an extension of the
relativity principle to uniformly accelerated systems (Einstein 1907). After having
embraced Minkowski’s geometrical interpretation of special relativity, in 1912
Einstein, as he later recalled (Einstein 1922, EA 1-14), had grasped the ‘‘decisive
idea’’: the analogy between his work on extending the principle of relativity to
accelerated motion with Gauss’s theory of surfaces, ‘‘without being aware at that
time of the work of Riemann, Ricci, and Levi-Civita’’ (Einstein 1922, EA 1-14).
Famously, in August 1912, Marcel Grossmann introduced Einstein to this
mathematical tradition: ‘‘never before in my life,’’ as Einstein wrote in a letter to
Arnold Sommerfeld in the October of the same year, ‘‘have I gained enormous
respect for mathematics, whose more subtle parts I have considered until now, in my
ignorance, as pure luxury’’ (CPAE, Vol. 5, Doc. 421)
Einstein and Grossmann jointly published the Entwurf einer verallgemeinerten
Relativita¨tsheorie und einer Theorie der Gravitation (Einstein and Grossmann
1913). Einstein’s ‘‘Entwurf’’ theory (just as his final general theory of relativity) is
built around a quadratic differential form ds2 =
P
glmdxldxm that assumes the name
of ‘‘metric tensor’’ or ‘‘fundamental tensor’’ (which corresponds to Ricci’s
‘‘covariant system of second rank’’ Einstein and Grossmann 1913, 25, n.). The
physical novelty consisted of course in the fact that the coefficients glm of the
quadratic differential form represent the behavior of measuring rods and clocks with
reference to the coordinate system, as well as the potentials of the gravitational field.
The geodesic trajectories of particles can be considered as the solutions to the
variational problem d
R
ds
  ¼ 0.
Grossmann/Einstein’s problem was then to find the ‘‘differential equations’’ to
determine ‘‘the quantities glm i.e., the gravitational field’’ (Einstein and Grossmann
1913, 11). Einstein’s strategy was famously to look for a ‘‘generally covariant’’
analogon of the Poisson’s equation o
2u
ox2 þ o
2u
oy2 þ o
2u
oz2 ¼ 4pkq: The ten potentials
glm ¼ gml play the role of the single potential u, whereas the density q corresponds
to the ten components of a second rank tensor Hlm, the so-called stress-energy
tensor. A second rank tensor Clm; constructed only from the gl m and their first and
second derivatives with respect to the coordinates (just like Poisson’s equation
involves the second derivative of the potential), should play the role of
the gravitational tensor: Thus the field equations ‘‘would likely have the form
j  Hlm ¼ Clm where j is a constant’’ (Einstein and Grossmann 1913, 11).
As the Zurich Notebook reveals (page 14L), Grossman had immediately found a
‘‘tensor of fourth manifold’’ (Tensor vierter Mannigfalfigkeit)—(ik, lm) using the
four-index-symbol notation—as the only tensor that contains only the metric tensor
and its first and second derivatives (CPAE 4, Doc. 10; for an extensive commentary
of the notebook see Renn 2007, vol. 1. and 2.). It turned out to be much more
complicated to find the exact form of the ‘‘covariant differential tensor of second
rank and second order’’ (Einstein and Grossmann 1913, 36), obtained from the
Riemann–Christoffel tensor by contraction (that is, by setting unlike indices equal)
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that could play the role of the gravitational tensor (having the same valence and rank
of the matter tensor).
Einstein and Grossman discarded the natural candidate, the so-called Ricci–
Tensor (see for instance: Maltese 1991), since ‘‘it does not reduce to D/’’, that is to
the Newtonian limit (assumed erroneously as spatially flat), ‘‘in the case of weak
static field’’ (Einstein and Grossmann 1913, 337). In subsequent years Einstein gave
up general covariance for the equations of gravitational field. An argument, which
came to be known as the ‘‘hole argument’’, even convinced Einstein that, as he
wrote to Paul Ehrenfest in early 1914, ‘‘generally covariant field equations that
determine the field completely from the matter tensor cannot exist at all’’ (CPAE,
Doc. 512, 5, 563; see for instance Norton 1987). In March of the same year Einstein
even wrote to Michele Besso that ‘‘[t]he general theory of invariants only acted as a
hindrance’’ (CPAE, 5, Doc. 514, 604).
In October 1914, Einstein, who in the meantime had moved to Berlin, presented a
systematic exposition of the Entwurf theory to the Berlin Academy entitled, Die
formale Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie (Einstein 1914). Section 7,
‘‘Geodesic line or equations of the point motion’’, introduced a fundamental formal
innovation, using the absolute differential calculus to express the equation of the
geodesic line independently of the coordinate using the Christoffel symbols
(Einstein 1914, 1044ff.):
d2xs
ds2
¼
X
lm
lm
s
 
dxl
ds
dxm
ds
After giving a presentation of the ‘‘hole argument’’ in § 12, in § 13 Einstein still
restricts the covariance of the field equations in order to ensure a unique relation
between glm and Tlm (Einstein 1914, 1066ff.).
3.2 Generally Covariant Field Equations
In the meantime the theory, which had initially been received rather suspiciously by
physicists, began to attract the interest of mathematicians such as Levi-Civita
himself (Cattani and De Maria, 1989) and David Hilbert (Mehra 1974; Earman and
Glymour 1978a; Sauer 1999; Corry 2003). Under the pressure of a hasty
competition with the latter, by November of 1915 Einstein regained general
covariance for his field equations, which he had abandoned ‘‘with a heavy heart’’
(Einstein 1915d, 778) three years before, and presented them in four communica-
tions to the Prussian Academy (Einstein 1915a, b, c, d). In the first of three papers
presented to the Berlin Academy he famously described the general theory of
relativity as:‘‘a real triumph of the method of the general differential calculus
founded by Gauss, Riemann, Christoffel, Ricci, and Levi-Civiter [sic]’’ (Einstein
1915d, 778; my emphasis).
Einstein proceeded very roughly as follows. The righthand side of the field
equations, the matter tensor Tlm, is a second rank and—because of the conservation
of energy-momentum—divergence-free tensor. The ‘‘Ricci tensor’’ Rlm—which
Einstein considered again as the reasonable candidate for the lefthand side of his
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equations—is a two-index-object as well, but its divergence is generally non-zero.
Einstein discovered that the tensor Glm obtained by subtracting the term
1
2
Rglm
(where R is the trace of Ricci tensor glmRlm) from the Ricci tensor Rlm is divergence-
free. The tensor Glm (later labeled ‘‘Einstein tensor’’) is therefore suitable to take on
the role of the gravitation tensor of the final field equations: Glm = -jTlm (Mehra
1974, 20; Pais 1982, 20). As Einstein explained to Hilbert in November 1915:
The difficulty was not in finding the generally covariant equations from the glm
for this is easily achieved with the aid of the Riemann’s tensor. Rather, it was
hard to recognize that these equations are a generalization, and precisely, a
simple and natural generalization of Newton’s law. It has just been in the last
few few weeks that I succeeded in this (I sent you my first communication) 3
whereas 3 years ago with my friend Grossmann, I had already taken into
consideration the only possible generally covariant equations, which have now
been shown to be the correct ones (Einstein to Hilbert, November 18, 1915;
CPAE 8a, Doc. 148, 201).
An important step toward the final breakthrough is usually considered the
overcoming of what Einstein famously called a ‘‘fateful prejudice’’ [ein verha¨ng-
nisvolles Vorurteil] (Einstein 1915d, 782) ‘‘The key to this solution’’ was found, as
he wrote in a letter to Sommerfeld, when Einstein (starting in November 1915)
came to realize that the negative Christoffel-symbols (of the second kind) Cslm ¼
 lv
s
 
are ‘‘to be regarded as the natural expression of the gravitational field
‘components’’’ (28.11.1915; CPAE 8a, Doc. 153, 207–208; Norton 2003; Janssen
2008).
A free material point moves with uniform motion in a straight line, relative to a
system in which the glm are constant ðCslm ¼ 0Þ. If a new system of coordinates is
smoothly introduced, the glm will no longer be constant, but will be functions of the
coordinates ðCslm 6¼ 0Þ; the motion of the free material point will present itself in the
new co-ordinates as curvilinear non-uniform motion. Via the principle of
equivalence, we can equally well interpret this motion as a motion under the
influence of a gravitational field.
As Einstein summarizes in the final 1916 ‘‘polished’’ presentation of the theory,
published in the Annalen der Physik (Einstein, 1916b), it is then natural to extend this
reasoning to the case ‘‘when we are no longer able by a suitable choice of co-ordinates
to apply the special theory of relativity to a finite region’’ (Einstein 1916b, 779), that is,
when the Cslm cannot be made to vanish identically, since the Riemann–Christoffel
tensor Rlms
q does not vanish (Norton 1985).
Interestingly, even if Einstein does refer to the non-Euclidean geometry, in his
1916 paper the Riemann–Christoffel tensor Rlms
q does not carry most of the
geometrical implications that we take for granted today; in particular Einstein does
not refer to the ‘‘curvature of spacetime’’ (Reich 1994, 204f.). The Riemann tensor
3 Einstein 1915d
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is introduced insofar as it is the only tensor that can be constructed solely from the
fundamental tensor without going beyond the second derivatives of the glm (as the
analogy with the Poisson equations requires).
A ‘‘geometrical’’ issue emerges instead when one has to compare the values of
the glm predicted by the field equations (let us say the Schwarzschild-solution,
Schwarzschild 1916) with the observed values. Until the end of his life Einstein
insisted on assuming ‘‘provisionally’’ (Howard 1990, 2005) that these can be
obtained by direct measurement using small rods and atomic clocks, the length and
rate of which are independent of the gravitational field they are embedded in
(Stachel 1989). Roughly, the glm are the numbers to which we have to multiply the
coordinate distances so that ds2 has the same absolute value (up to the global choice
of unit of measure) everywhere on the manifold.
3.3 Critique and Geometrical Development of Absolute Differential Calculus
As early as 1916, the Austrian physicist Friedrich Kottler criticized Einstein for
referring to the Christoffel symbols as the components of the gravitational field
(Kottler 1916). Christoffel Symbols are not tensors, and they can be non-zero in a
flat spacetime simply by virtue of curvilinear coordinates. Responding to Kottler,
Einstein suggested that the equation d
2xs
ds2
¼ Cslm dxlds dxmds ‘‘as a whole is generally
covariant’’ (Einstein 1916a, 641), but the two terms taken separately are not. In
particular the first term of the geodesic equation can be taken as representing ‘‘the
Galilean inertia’’, and the second term with the Christoffel symbols, as ‘‘represent-
ing influence of the gravitational field upon the mass point’’ (Einstein 1916a, 641).
Neither of these per se has physical meaning, only their ‘‘sum’’ does.
In Einstein’s view the covariance principle and the equivalence principle appear then
to be deeply connected: the variability of glm and the non-vanishing of theC
s
lm introduced
by a coordinate transformation can be interpreted arbitrarily as an acceleration field or
as a (homogeneous) gravitational field: ‘‘the requirement of general covariance of
equations embraces the principle of equivalence as a quite special case’’ (Einstein
1916a, 641). Einstein explicitly embraced the view that the gravitational field is a
coordinate-dependent quantity (Einstein 1918a, 699f.; see Janssen 2011).
The most famous objection against Einstein’s use of the absolute differential
calculus was raised of course by Erich Kretschmann in 1917 (Kretschmann 1917).
The principle of ‘‘general covariance’’ as complete coordinate generality in the
formulation of a physical theory has no particular physical content, and thus it has
nothing to do with a principle of relativity. In fact ‘‘according to Ricci and Levi-
Civita’s investigations’’ (Kretschmann 1917, 579) every space-time theory can be
formulated in a generally co-variant way, only by inserting the glm and the C
s
lm into
the equations of the theory (for more on this topic see Rynasiewicz 1999; Norton
2003). In a 1918 paper, Einstein agreed with Kretschman’s claim, emphasizing
nevertheless the heuristic value of general covariance when combined with a
principle of simplicity (Einstein 1918c).
A more compelling answer was provided by Hermann Weyl in the first edition of
Raum–Zeit–Materie (Weyl 1918b). Even if every theory can be rewritten in a
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generally covariant form, in pre-general-relativistic theories such as special
relativity, the metric displays the pre-assigned Minkowski values gik and the C
i
hl
vanish everywhere; in general relativity one finds these values only after having
solved the field equations: ‘‘This seals the doom of the Idea that a geometry may
exist independently of physics in the traditional sense’’ (Weyl 1918b, 174).
Weyl could make this point clear by exploiting the geometrical implications of
tensor calculus that were developed in those years under the stimulus of general
relativity. In 1916/1917, Levi-Civita (Levi-Civita 1916, but see also Hessenberg
1718 and Schouten, 1919) had famously recognized the geometrical meaning of the
Christoffel symbols as determining the parallel displacement of vectors (Struik
1989; Reich 1992). A displacement preserving the direction of a vector can be
expressed in general coordinates precisely by the fact that the Christoffel symbols
can be made to vanish along the path; thus roughly, referring to the displacement
operation, the Cihl turned out to be expressible without referring to gik.
The absolute differential calculus can then be the founded ‘‘geometrically’’.
When a vector in a Euclidean space is parallel-transported around a loop, it will
always return to its original position (Cihl vanish overall on the manifold). However,
this property does not hold in the general case. The Riemann curvature tensor
measures precisely the change in the direction (but not in magnitude as in Weyl’s
more general non-Riemannian geometry Weyl 1918c) of a vector after it is
transported around a closed loop (Weyl 1918b, § 16). Along a geodesic path the
vector will remain ‘unchanged’, so that a geodesic line can be defined in a non-
metrical way as the straightest line rather than the line of extremal length (Weyl
1918b, § 17).
In the third revised edition of Raum–Zeit–Materie published in 1919, the
Christoffel Symbols Cisr ¼ Cirs are considered as the ‘‘components of an affine
connection’’ (Weyl 1919, 101). Precisely because it is not a tensor, the affine
connection provides an adequate representation of the fact required by Einstein’s
interpretation of the equivalence principle: there is no unique decomposition of the
connection into an inertial background plus a gravitational field (Stachel 2007).
In 1920, Weyl introduced the celebrated expression ‘‘guiding field’’ (Fu¨hrungs-
feld) for the affine connection: general relativity does make every motion relative,
eliminating the structure responsible for the distinction between geodesic and non-
geodesic worldlines; Einstein’s theory instead transformed such a constraining
‘‘guidance’’ in a physical force-field, in which ‘‘according to Einstein, inertia and
gravitation constitute an inseparable unity’’ (Weyl 1920). Motion along a geodesic
path or deflection from a geodesic path are absolutely different, but can be
interpreted arbitrarily as the effect of inertia or gravitation.
In 1920, in the unpublished paper Grundgedanken und Methoden der Relativ-
ita¨tstheorie in ihrer Entwicklung dargestellt (CPAE 7, Doc. 31), Einstein, using a
celebrated analogy with the electromagnetic field, which will be split differently
into electric and magnetic components by different observers, came to recognize
that the crucial point of general relativity is the fact that ‘‘the gravitational field only
has a relative existence’’ (CPAE 7, Doc. 31, p. 21; Janssen 2005, 2008). In the
Princeton Lectures, published in the same year, Einstein emphasized again that this
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is well represented by the fact that ‘‘the intensity of the gravitational field’’ is
expressed by the quantities Clab ,which ‘‘do not have a tensor character’’ (Einstein
1921b, 52) and thus are coordinate-dependent.
In the early 1920s, E´lie Cartan, starting from Levi-Civita’s geometrical notion of
parallel displacement, considered gravity, mathematically represented by the affine
connection, as the structure reconciling the different orientations of local inertial
frames (Cartan 1923, 1924b, 1925). From this point of view, according to Cartan,
‘‘relativity faces the paradoxical task of interpreting, in a non-homogeneous
universe, all the results of so many experiences by observers who believe in
homogeneity of the universe’’ (Cartan 1924a, 81). At this point, it might be said, the
connection of Ricci’s calculus with Riemann’s original geometrical approach is
restored. With general relativity, as Levi-Civita noticed some years later, clearly
hinting at Bianchi’s words, ‘‘Ricci’s calculus revealed itself to be not only useful but
truly indispensable’’ (Levi-Civita 1925, 11, tr. 1927, VII).
4 Relativity of Coordinates Versus Relativity of Geometry: The Young
Reichenbach’s Conversion to Conventionalism
On the philosophical side, in as early as March 1917 Schlick had published an
article version of his classical Raum und Zeit in der gegenwa¨rtigen Physik (Schlick
1917a). The work appeared in the same year in book form (Schlick 1917b), which
was published in four different editions up until 1922 (see Schlick 2006, vol I, 2).
Schlick, as is well known, exploited the geometrical implications of General
Relativity in a quite different way, by casting general relativity in a conventionalist
tradition, which Schlick had allegedly found in the work of Riemann, Helmholtz
and, most of all, Poincare´. Space-time is in itself metrically ‘‘amorphous
[gestaltlos]’’, as Poincare´ has argued (Schlick 1917a, 167); a certain space or
space-time is indistinguishable from every other by a continuous and one-to-one
transformation that preserves the neighborhood relations among points or events.
Hence the choice among them can only be made by an arbitrary stipulation, an
implication which Schlick called ‘‘the geometrical relativity of space’’ (Schlick
1917a, § II).
Einstein, as it is well known, was very pleased by Schlick’s paper and his opinion
was similarly very positive for the book version (Howard 1984). However, in as
early as 1920, in his first monograph on relativity, Hans Reichenbach, who had
attended Einstein’s lectures on general relativity in Berlin in the late 1910s, had
raised a rather convincing objection against a conventionalist approach to general
relativity.
Conventionalism, Reichenbach argued, works only for spaces of constant
curvature. In Riemannian geometry of variable curvature no unique set of congruence
relations can be defined all over the space, so the very idea of a unique conventional
choice among alternative congruent relations does not make sense. For this reason,
Reichenbach points out, Poincare´ ‘‘excludes from the beginning Riemannian
geometry, because it does not permit the displacement of a body without change of
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form’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 104, n. 1; tr. 1965, 109, n. 1; translation modified). In the
general case, only the unit of length is globally available on a Riemannian manifold
(per convention, all observers can agree to use, for instance, the centimeter as the unit
of measure). In contrast, in in the non-Riemannian geometry of Weyl a separate unit of
length at every point of space may be defined.
According to Reichenbach, Einstein’s general theory, adopting the Riemannian
approach, leads rather ‘‘to an absolutely objective determination of the structure of
space’’ (Reichenbach 1920a, 405; tr. 2006, 29). Even if we are free to choose the
coordinate system, only the properties that are independent of a particular
coordinate system are physically meaningful: ‘‘Relativity does not mean the
abandoning of a judgment, but the liberation of the objective sense of knowledge
from its distortion through our subjective nature’’ (Reichenbach 1920a, 405; tr.
2006, 29, on the importance of this topic see Ryckman 2005, § 2.4.4).
In these few words Reichenbach seemed to catch what general relativity had
inherited from the Riemannian tradition: Riemannian geometry is formulated in such a
way that it works in arbitrary coordinates. Whereas Schlick tried to cast the
contribution of Riemannian geometry to general relativity in the light of Helmholtz’s
and Poincare´’s philosophy of geometry as the freedom of choosing among different
physical geometries, Reichenbach insisted that Riemann had showed under which
condition it was possible to express the same physical space-time by different
mathematical functions depending on which coordinates were used.
4.1 Relativity of Coordinates: Reichenbach’s Early Interpretation
of Riemannian Geometry and of its Role in General Relativity
Reichenbach’s early approach reproduces quite well Einstein’s original reasoning.
As Einstein wrote to Schlick, ‘‘in principle there can exist finite (matter-free) parts
of the world’’ (Einstein to Schlick, March 21, 1917; CPAE 8a 305) that can be
covered by a rectangular grid of unit rods and clocks. The four-dimensional line
element is expressed as the sum of the squares of the coordinate differential
ds2 ¼P41 dx2m . If one introduces new curvilinear coordinates by means of an
arbitrary smooth substitution of the independent variables, the line element will not
preserve its simple form but will change into a mixed quadratic expression:
ds2 ¼P41 glmdxmdxm :
The coefficients glm occurring in [the mixed quadratic differential form]
manifest themselves in the acceleration of the second coordinate system
relative to the inertial system; since this acceleration directly characterizes the
gravitational field of the second system, we may regard it as a measure of this
gravitational field. We notice, therefore, that the transition from a gravity-free
field to a gravitational field is connected with a transition to non-Euclidean
coordinates, and that the metric of these coordinates is a measure of the
gravitational field (Reichenbach, 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 24).
Reichenbach, however, is careful to emphasize that ‘‘[s]uch a space is only
apparently non-Euclidean; actually it does not differ structurally from Euclidean
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space’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 25; my emphasis). The non-Euclidean
appearance of the line element does not necessarily imply a non-Euclidean
geometry. It is, on the contrary, the very same flat space-time that ‘‘can be expressed
in terms of non-Euclidean coordinates’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 25; my
emphasis), where the glm are not constant but functions of the coordinates.
Einstein identified the presence of the gravitational field with the non-constancy
of glm. As Reichenbach observes, the ‘‘transition is made from the special theory to
the general theory of relativity’’ can be considered as ‘‘a far reaching extrapola-
tion’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 24; tr. 1965, 26; my emphasis). Einstein ‘‘inferred from
this that every gravitational field, not only that which is produced by transformation,
manifests itself by a deviation from Euclidean geometry’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 23;
tr. 1965, 24). The presence of gravitation manifests itself in the non-constancy of the
glm, also in the case where it is not possible ‘‘to choose the coordinates in such a way
that the line element becomes Euclidean at all points simultaneously’’ (Reichenbach
1920b, 27; tr. 1965, 29).
This is the significance of the introduction of a quadratic form with variable
coefficients: (cf. Ryckman 2005, 35ff.):
The special position of the mixed quadratic form of the line element can also
be characterized in the following way. The ten functions glm determining the
metric are not absolutely fixed, but depend on the choice of the coordinates.
They are not independent of one another, however, and if four of them are
given, the coordinates as well as the other six functions are determined. This
dependence expresses the absolute character of the curvature of space. The
metric functions glm are not relative; that is, their choice is not arbitrary
(Reichenbach, 1920b, 27; tr. 1965, 29; my emphasis).
If one covers a flat space with ‘‘any curved oblique coordinates, then the line element
will become a mixed quadratic expression. Even the ordinary polar coordinates furnish
an expression differing from the pure quadratic sum for the line element’’
(Reichenbach 1920b, 24; tr. 1965, 25). Thus, even the very simple ‘‘representation
of Euclidean space by means of polar coordinates can be conceived as a projection
upon a non-Euclidean space’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 24; tr. 1965, 25). In polar
coordinates the glm are not constant. However ‘‘the Riemannian measure of curvature
of this system will be zero at every point’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 23; tr. 1965, 25). The
lines of the coordinate grid are curved, but not the surface itself. Cartesian coordinates,
where the glm has constant values, can be reintroduced by a simple coordinate
transformation. By contrast, on a non-flat non-Euclidean space ‘‘it is impossible to
preserve its simple Euclidean form’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 94; tr. 1965, 99). Cartesian
coordinates simply do not exist:
the four space-time coordinates can be chosen arbitrarily, but that the ten
metric functions glm may not be assumed arbitrarily; they have definite values
for every choice of coordinates… If the metric were a purely subjective
matter, then the Euclidean metric would have to be suitable for physics; as a
consequence, all ten functions glm could be selected arbitrarily. However, the
theory of relativity teaches that the metric is subjective only insofar as it is
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dependent upon the arbitrariness of the choice of coordinates, and that
independently of them it describes an objective property of the physical world
(Reichenbach 1920b, 86–87; tr. 1965, 90–91)
As Reichenbach recognizes, the mathematical apparatus of Riemannian geometry
is mainly concerned with the problem of establishing when different sets of glm
represent different geometries, and when they are merely the consequence of the
coordinate system used. As we have seen, Riemann, Christoffel and Ricci had found
in the so called Riemann–Christoffel tensor an absolute criterion for distinguishing
the class of different glm-systems that differs only by a coordinate transformation
from other classes.
Hence, the freedom in the choice of the coordinate system has nothing to do with
the freedom in the choice of geometry:
It is true that the metric contains a subjective element, and depending on the
choice of the system of reference, the metric coefficients will vary; this
indeterminacy [Unbestimmtheit] still holds in the gravitational field. But there
exist dependency relations among the metric coefficients, and if four of them
are arbitrarily given for the whole space, then the other six are determined by
transformation formulas. … That something exists manifests itself in the
dependency relations between the metric coefficients; since we can discover
these relations by means of measurements—and only by means of them—we
can discover the real. It is the essence of the general theory of relativity that
the metric is much more than a mathematical measurement of bodies; it is the
form by means of which the body is described as an element in the material
world. (Reichenbach, 1920b, 96–97; tr. 1965, 102; my emphasis)
Reichenbach insists on the fact that such indeterminacy, i.e. the existence of non-
physical degrees of freedom, does not reflect any lack of determinacy of the
geometrical structure of the world. Reichenbach then came to the conclusion that
the metric contains a subjective aspect which depends on the choice of the
coordinate system and objective one, which is expressed in the dependencies among
the metric coefficients.
In a way somehow similar to that of Arthur Eddington (Eddington, 1920), the still
‘‘Kantian’’ Reichenbach emphasizes the epistemological significance of the use of
tensor calculus. The philosophical meaning of the ‘‘Riemannian analytic metric’’ is
that it presents the mathematical technique to isolate those elements that have
objective physical significances, from those that are merely artifacts of the
coordinates: ‘‘invariance with respect to the transformations characterizes the
objective content of reality, the structure of reason expresses itself in the arbitrariness
of admissible systems’’ (Reichenbach 1920b, 86; tr. 1965, 90; my emphasis).
4.2 Relativity of Geometry: Reichenbach’s Last Step to Conventionalism
After having the opportunity to take a first look at Reichenbach’s book, Schlick
immediately wrote to Einstein: ‘‘Reichenbach does not seem to me to be fair [nicht
gerecht zu sein] toward Poincare´’s conventionalism [Konventionslehre]’’ (Schlick
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an Einstein, 9.10.1920; CPAE 10, Doc. 171). Writing to Reichenbach some weeks
later, Schlick tried to debunk Reichenbach’s critique of conventionalism by arguing
that Poincare´ in later writings included geometries of variable curvature in his
approach (Reichenbach to Schlick 26.11.1920; Schlick and Reichenbach 1922).
Reichenbach responded by agreeing on the fact that in principle one could choose
between keeping relativity and abandoning Euclidean geometry or vice-versa:
‘‘physics, however, makes the first decision… you, and Poincare´, would say for the
sake of simplicity [um der Einfachheit halber]… But I have an instinctive
disinclination [Abneigung] for this interpretation’’ (Reichenbach to Schlick
29.11.1920; Schlick and Reichenbach 1922).
Schlick’s arguments must have been very persuasive. Reichenbach quickly
overcame his ‘‘instinctive disinclination’’ for conventionalism (on this point see:
Parrini 2005; Dieks 2010). Einstein’s epistemological achievement becomes precisely
that he has shown it would have been possible in principle for physics to make the
second decision, that is, to get rid of non-Euclidean geometry by preserving gravitation
as a real force. Einstein’s reference to Poincare´ in Geometrie und Erfahrung (Einstein
1921a) probably played some in Reichenbach’s conversion. However, the logical
empiricists failed to notice (see Schlick’s commetary in Helmholtz 1921; Schlick
1921; Reichenbach 1921, 355; 1878, I, 33) that Einstein’s reference should be read in
the context of Einstein’s ‘‘measuring rod objection’’ against Weyl’s theory of
electromagnetism (Weyl 1918a; Einstein 1918b), rather than as an argument for
geometrical conventionalism (Ryckman 2005, § 3.5; see also Giovanelli 2012).
In a paper published in French in 1922 (Reichenbach 1922, tr. 2006),
Reichenbach explicitly claims that ‘‘[t]he solution to the problem of space is
therefore found only in this conception we call conventionalism which goes back to
Helmholtz and Poincare´’’ (Reichenbach 1922, 40; tr. 2006, 135). If the measure-
ments with rigid rods yield a non-Euclidean geometry, one could, alternatively,
maintain that the geometry of space-time was Euclidean, holding that measuring
instruments are actually non-rigid, and deformed by a non-detectable force of type
X, which causes uniform shrinkages and expansions in all materials. According to
Reichenbach, ‘‘the real problem lies in deciding between these alternatives: either
Euclidean geometry and a field X or the geometry determined by experience and no
field X’’ (Reichenbach 1922, 40; tr. 2006; 135). The empirical facts can force us to
select between either the Euclidean or the non-Euclidean description as the uniquely
correct description.
Of course, gravitation, in Reichenbach’s terminology is ‘‘a force of type X,’’
(Reichenbach 1922, 41; tr. 2006; 132); as a consequence of the identity of inertial
and gravitational mass, it affects all bodies in the same way. Einstein’s choice ‘‘to
set X = 0’’ (Reichenbach 1922, 43; tr. 2006; 129) and abandon Euclidean geometry
was the simplest choice, but not the only one possible. According to Reichenbach,
the very existence of these alternatives represents the ‘‘characteristic of the
epistemological solutions for which we are indebted to the theory of relativity’’
(Reichenbach, 1922, 40; tr. 2006; 135).
When, however, Reichenbach describes in some detail why gravitation is a force of
type X, it is not the choice among different geometries that comes to the fore:
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It is also in this fashion that we can obtain the remarkable identification of
gravitation with certain fictitious forces that result from a change in
coordinates. Imagine a gravitation-free space in which we find a system of
coordinates formed by a network of congruent rigid rods. In this space the
metric is Euclidean; that is to say the glm possess the well-known special form
[ds2 =
P
dxm
2]. If we now introduce new coordinates such that the rods get
progressively shorter the farther to the exterior a rod is, so that the network
will be considered to be curved, then the new glm take a form different from
the special form. This can be conceived of in the following way: there exists a
force which shrinks the rods and this force is represented by the deviation of
the glm from the special form; it is therefore considered to be a correction in
the establishment of the ds2. It is clear that this force … is only a fictitious
force produced by the anomaly of the rods. All of the magnitudes that, in an
element of the network, are measured with a local unit undergo the same
correction; this is precisely the motivation for considering this fictitious force
to be interpreted as a gravitational field (Reichenbach 1922, 39; tr. 2006; 134;
my emphasis).
In the example considered by Reichenbach, one is not in front of alternative
geometries; it is the very same flat geometry in different coordinate systems. A
matter-free region of space-time appears to be devoid of gravitation from the
perspective of one coordinate system and endowed with a gravitational field when
considered from another coordinate system: the difference is one of description.
Gravitation is a ‘‘fictitious force’’ because it is coordinate-dependent: as Reichen-
bach’s writes ‘‘the gravitational field and the corrections resulting froma simple
change in coordinates can be brought together in a single concept’’ (Reichenbach
1922, 39; tr. 2006; 134).
This is of course the very core of the equivalence principle as Einstein originally
presented it. As Reichenbach explains, although only in a brief footnote, ‘‘it is
necessary here to draw a distinction between the gravitational potential and the
gravitational field’’, that is, between ‘‘the gravitational potentials (the glm)’’ and
‘‘[i]ts gradient, the field’’ (Reichenbach 1922, 39, n.; tr. 2006; 134, n.). The
components of the metric represents the ‘‘gravitational potentials’’, whereas, like in
other field theories, the ‘‘gradient of the potentials’’ is the natural candidate for
representing the gravitational field.
What distinguishes the gravitational field from other fields is the fact that in a flat
region of space-time, non-constant potentials glm can be introduced by ‘‘a simple
change in coordinates’’. The transition to the general theory of relativity is realized
by the assumption that such a representation of the field by the non-constancy of the
functions glm, is also justified in the general case in which the metric cannot be
reduced to quasi-Euclidean form of the special theory of relativity by ‘‘a simple
change in coordinates’’.
In his more technical writing Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum–Zeit–Lehre
(Reichenbach 1924), Reichenbach emphasizes that what characterizes a local
inertial system is the fact that the gradient of the metric
oglm
oxr
can be made to vanish
by a coordinate transformation, whereas in a general gravitational field this is
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impossible, as the gradient of the metric
o2glm
oxroxq
does not vanish. However
Reichenbach’s philosophical conclusion is stunningly different (cf. Reichenbach,
1924, 106; tr. 1965, 133).
Focusing on what he now calls ‘‘metrical forces’’ (Reichenbach, 1924, 68; tr. 1965,
87) (because they depend on the choice of the metric), Reichenbach is convinced that
‘‘space and time in the general theory of relativity mean the same as in the special
theory although without any metric’’ (Reichenbach 1924, 155; tr. 1965, 195; my
emphasis); the ‘‘topological properties turn out to be more constant that the metrical
one’’, so that Reichenbach famously argues that ‘‘the transition from the special theory
to the general one represents merely a renunciation of metrical characteristics, while
the fundamental topological character of space and time remains the same.’’
(Reichenbach 1924, 155; tr. 1965, 195)
In the immediately subsequent years, logical empiricists quickly came to agree
on the fact that such an opposition between the topological and the metrical
properties of space-time is the relevant innovation introduced by general relativity.
Carnap, in his first post-doctoral writings (Carnap 1923, 1925), could easily
translate his early ‘‘Kantian’’ conventionalism into an empiricist framework (Carnap
1922). Only topological space reproduces what is present in experience uni-vocally.
By contrast, all post-topological structure depends upon a stipulation.
5 Reichenbach’s Mature Conventionalism and the ‘‘Analytic Treatment
of Riemannian Spaces’’
By the end of 1926 4, Reichenbach had already finished his semi-popular
Philosophie der Raum–Zeit–Lehre (1926, but published only as Reichenbach 1928;
tr. Reichenbach 1958), which furnishes a very elegant and effective presentation of
this doctrine and of the noble tradition from which it emerges:
This conception of the problem of geometry is essentially the result of the
work of Riemann, Helmholtz, and Poincare´ and is known as conventionalism.
While Riemann prepared the way for an application of geometry to physical
reality by his mathematical formulation the concept of space, Helmholtz laid
the philosophical foundations. In particular, he recognized the connection of
the problem of geometry with that of rigid bodies … It is Einstein’s
achievement to have applied the theory of the relativity of geometry to
physics. The surprising result was the fact that the world is non-Euclidean, as
the theorists of relativity are wont to say; in our language this means: if F = 0,
the geometry G becomes non-Euclidean. This outcome had not been
anticipated, and Helmholtz and Poincare´ still believed that the geometry
obtained could not be proved to be different from Euclidean geometry. Only
Einstein’s theory of gravitation predicted the non-Euclidean result which was
confirmed by astronomical observations (Reichenbach 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35).
4 cf. Reichenbach’s letter to Schlick on December, 6 1926 mentioned in (Schlick 2006, vol. 6, 175)
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According to what Reichenbach calls theorem h, a non-Euclidean geometry G is
equivalent to an Euclidean geometry G0 with a field of ‘‘universal forces’’ F. Only
the combination G ? F is testable by experience, after a conventional choice has
been made. Einstein chose the simplest convention by setting F = 0.
The action of such a force is not completely arbitrary. In order to avoid causal
anomalies (Reichenbach 1928, § 12), the original geometry G must be mapped into
the new one G0 uniquely and continuously. The very lesson we can draw from
Einstein’s theory is that we are free to choose among topologically equivalent, but
metrically different spaces, that can be smoothly deformed into one another, by
some ‘‘force’’ F that affects all bodes. The ‘‘metrical relations are distorted’’
(Reichenbach 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35), whereas the ‘‘topological’’ structure remains
untouched. According to Reichenbach, the world as it is in-itself does not have a
unique metric; it does, however, have a unique topology, and this is defined in terms
of the causal relations.
Reichenbach believed that Riemann had established the mathematical framework
for this philosophical conclusion. Riemann’s ‘‘mathematical achievement’’ is ‘‘of
greatest significance for the epistemological problem of space’’ (Reichenbach 1928,
244; tr. 1958, 279f.). ‘‘The mathematical treatment’’ divides the description of a
space ‘‘into a topological and a metrical part’’: ‘‘the function of numbering’’ is
assigned to the coordinate system on the one hand; whereas ‘‘the metrical functions
of measuring lengths’’ are assigned ‘‘to the metrical coefficients glm’’ (Reichenbach
1928, 244; tr. 1958, 280) on the other. In Riemannian geometry the ‘‘metrical
function of the glm plays a subordinate role. It cannot change the topological
foundation determined by the coordinate system. It merely adds to it a metrical
superstructure [U¨berbau]’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 244; tr. 1958, 280).
5.1 Reichenbach’s Technical Presentation of Riemannian Geometry and its
Incompatibility With His Own Conventionalism
In Reichenbach’s view Riemann deprived the coordinate system of all but
topological properties. This interpretation seems however to be based on a
fundamental misunderstanding. Indeed, in Riemannian geometry coordinates have
no metrical significance per se; they are only a set of markers that serve to
distinguish the points. Yet such a significance is regained by the introduction of a
quadratic differential form with variable coefficients glm as function of the
coordinates. Instead of separating the metric and topological significance of the
coordinate system, Riemannian geometry shows that there is no other source of
information about the coordinates apart from the glm.
One is free to introduce any coordination of the physical space that is produced
by an arbitrary, smooth transformation from the original. However, this transfor-
mation is accompanied by a suitable change of the glm, so that that the ds
2 are
unchanged; all measured relations can be ‘‘recovered’’ in the new coordinate system
by using the new g0lm to get real distances from coordinate distances. ‘‘The numbers
glm indicate how, at a given place, the length of the line element is to be calculated
from the coordinate differentials’’ (Reichenbach, 1928, 243; tr. 1958, 279).
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As Reichenbach has explained in his 1920 monograph, the coordinate system is
arbitrary, but the dependency of the glm from the coordinate system has an objective
meaning. This still emerges clearly from Reichenbach’s own presentation of the
‘‘Analytic Treatment of Riemannian Spaces’’ in his 1926/1928 book:
This fact is expressed analytically by a property of the glm, as we shall see
when we investigate transformations to other coordinate systems. Let us
imagine that a second coordinate system has been introduced and that the
position of the new family of lines is given as a function of the old
coordinates, … We now add the restriction that the transition to the new
coordinates must not change any of the metrical relations; this transition,
therefore, leads only to a different form of description. We must then specify a
new system g0lm of metrical coefficients relative to the new coordinates x
0
l such
that the old relations of congruence are preserved. If two line segments are
equally long when measured by the old glm in the old coordinate system, they
must still be equally long when measured by the new g0lm in the new coordinate
system. This requirement leads to the condition that
ds2 ¼ glmdxldxm ¼ g0rsdx0rdx0s
We can therefore say that ds2 is an invariant of the transformation, and we can show
from (8) how the new glm are to be calculated from the old ones. (Reichenbach
1928, 281; tr. 1958, 245; my emphasis)
As we have seen, a classic example is the passage from using Cartesian
(rectangular) coordinates to polar coordinates. The points are relabeled with
different numbers (for instance, in a surface the point with Cartesian coordinates
(1, 1) has polar coordinates
ffiffiffi
2
p
; p
4
). However, regardless of the coordinate system
used, the distances between any two pairs of points are assigned the same value. The
same flat Euclidean metric is expressed in a different coordinate system.
Geometrical conventionalism violated exactly this condition, which in Rie-
mann’s approach should be considered as fundamental. This emerges clearly from
Reichenbach’s attempt to cast the loose language of universal forces in a more
formal framework: if the results of measurement yield a metric glm which is non-
Euclidean, then one can infer that the geometry is actually given by the normal
matrix glm, if one stipulates that our measuring rods were under the influence of a
universal force F.
Generally the force F is a tensor. If the g0lm are the metrical coefficients of the
geometry G0 and glm those of G, the potentials Flm of the force F are given by
g0lm þ Flm ¼ glm. The measuring rods furnish directly the g0lm; the Flm are the
‘‘correction factors’’ by which the g0lm, are corrected so that glm results. The
universal force F influencing the measuring rod is usually dependent on
the orientation of the measuring rod (Reichenbach 1928, 44, n.; tr. 1958, 33).
Let the g0lm represent some non-flat geometry; then the introduction of the arbitrary
potentials Flm of a universal force field leads us to conclude that the metric of the space
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can be reduced to a Euclidean flat one glm: ds
2 ¼ glmdxldxm ¼ ðg0lm þ FlmÞdx0ldx0m
(Norton 1994). The equation deals precisely with a glm system which cannot be
transformed into g0lm by a coordinate transformation if the line element has to be
preserved. In fact, if this equation is valid, then trivially the quadratic form is not an
invariant ds2 ¼ glmdxldxm 6¼ g0lmdx0ldx0m. If two tracts are congruent when measured by
the old glm in the old coordinate system, then they are not equally long when measured
by the new g0lm in the new coordinate system. Thus, the two geometries can be
transformed into one another only if one renounces the invariant character of ds2; in
other words, one deprives space of its metrical properties, i.e. the structure which tells
how much space or time lies between point-events.
5.2 Reichenbach on Riemann’s A¨quivalenzproblem
There is a sort of conflict between Reichenbach’s philosophical intentions and
Reichenbach’s own popularization of the mathematical apparatus of Riemannian
geometry. Philosophically, Reichenbach attempted to interpret Riemann’s approach
from the perspective of Helmholtz’s and Poincare´’s problem of finding a criterion
for choosing between different metrical geometries that only agree on the
‘‘topological order of all space-points determined through the coordinate system’’
(Reichenbach 1929b, 683). Riemann’s main concern, in contrast, was that of finding
a criterion to discern the properties of the same metrical geometry that depend on
the choice of a coordinate system from those that are coordinate independent. This
can be understood only if one considers Riemann’s geometrical insight from the
perspective of the non-geometrical development put forward by Christoffel and
Ricci.
From this vantage point, as again Reichenbach explains very clearly in the less
philosophical parts of the book, it appears that Riemann wanted to investigate
differentclasses of quadratic differential forms. Each class, insofar as the line
elements can be transformed into one another by simple coordinate transformation,
represents the same geometry. On the contrary, glm-systems, which cannot be
transformed into one another by any change of the coordinates represents different
geometries:
We may restate our results as follows: any given system glm can be
transformed into another system grs, by means of [a smooth change of
variables]. Transformations of this kind, starting with a definite set glm do not
give us all conceivable systems, however, but merely a limited class. The
systems of this class are geometrically equivalent to the initial glm, and the
class as a whole characterizes a definite geometry. Other classes similarly
constructed, would characterize another geometry. A special class is the class
which contains the normal system; it is the class of Euclidean geometry
(Reichenbach 1928, 282f.; tr. 1958, 246).
The very purpose of Riemann’s investigation was to decide when two glm-systems
differ only by a coordinate transformation and are therefore geometrically
equivalent. Two metrics are equivalent, if and only if there is a coordinate
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transformation that transforms glm into g
0
lm so that ds
2 ¼ ds02. This is of course
precisely the A¨quivalenzproblem. As we have seen, it is mainly due to the merit of
Christoffel and Ricci that the mathematical technique for dealing with this problem
was developed. Reichenbach describes it once again very accurately:
The question now arises whether there exists a special characteristic of the
class of Euclidean Geometry. Mathematicians have shown that it is possible to
formulate such a criterion. For this purpose one has to form a certain
mathematical combination of the glm and glm;
oglm
oxr
;
o2glm
oxsoxr
which is called Rlmrs :
::: Rlmrs is therefore a tensor of rank 4. We can recognize directly … a very
important property of all tensors, namely, that if all components of a tensor are
zero in one coordinate system, they will all be zero in every other coordinate
system.… Since it can be shown that Rlmrs, vanishes for the normal system, it
follows that every system of the Euclidean class is characterized by the
condition
Rlmrs ¼ 0
Rlmrs is called the Riemannian curvature tensor. It is a measure of curvature.
(Reichenbach 1928, 283; tr. 1958, 246)
As we have seen, Rlmrs entails the first and second derivatives of the glm. Since it is
a tensor, if it vanishes in one coordinate system, it vanishes in all coordinate
systems. All inter-transformable glm-systems represent the same Euclidean geom-
etry, since in all these cases, even if the glm can be variable, the Riemann tensor
vanishes. On the contrary, the Christoffel symbols Cslm, which entail the first
derivatives of the glm, are not tensors. If they vanish in one coordinate system, they
do not vanish in another. Hence we cannot expect that the glm, or the C
s
lm, should
give something of absolute significance. We have to differentiate the glm twice
before we arrive at something that has a significance independent of any special
coordinate system.
6 Relativity of Geometry Versus Relativity of Gravitation
Reichenbach was philosophically convinced the that ‘‘metrical properties of the
space-time continuum are destroyed by gravitational fields’’ (Reichenbach 1928,
269; tr. 1958, 308; my emphasis); since an alternative to Einstein’s stipulation
would have been in principle possible, space-time has no definite metrical structure.
However, once again, following Reichenbach’s semi-technical presentation of
general relativity rather than his philosophical interpretation, one finds a more
humble truth: the gravitational fields, merely ‘‘destroy the orthogonal form of the
line element’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253; my emphasis).
Let us consider again an inertial frame K without a gravitational field, that is, a
frame where ‘‘the g0rs will satisfy the normal matrix. If we now describe the same
local world region from an accelerated system K, the glm of this system can no
longer satisfy the normal matrix’’; hence ‘‘the glm will characterize the acceleration
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of K’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 288; tr. 1958, 253); but, because of the equivalence
principle ‘‘[i]f they characterize the state of acceleration of K, ’’ (Reichenbach 1928,
289; tr. 1958, 253), ‘‘they must also characterize the gravitational field which exist
for K’’. Of course, the geometry of space has not changed in passing from g0rs to glm;
rather, it is the same flat Minkowski geometry, represented in different coordinate
systems (Reichenbach 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253).
6.1 The Equivalence Principle and the Christoffel-Symbols
As Reichenbach already briefly explained in a footnote in his 1922 article, Einstein
identified the gravitational field with the gradient of the potentialsglm that is, with
the non-vanishing of the Christoffel symbols Cslm: As in every field theory, in
gravitational theory one distinguishes the ‘‘concepts of potential and gradient’’; in
electricity theory, the force field is the gradient of the electric potentials;
analogously, in general relativity ‘‘the gravitational force will … be characterized
by the potential gradient [Potentialgefa¨lle] which can be calculated for every point
from the potential field’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 268; tr. 1958, 233).
According to Reichenbach ‘‘[t]his representation explains why the gravitational
field can be transformed away’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236). As we have
seen, in Einstein’s original approach, within a small enough region of space-time,
one can introduce an ‘‘artificial gravitational’’ field by simply introducing a
coordinate system, in which the glm are not constant, but become functions of the
coordinates. For the very same reason one can make this gravitational field
disappear through a coordinate transformation: we can set ‘‘the metrical field in such
a manner that the components, the gravitational potentials [glm] become constants
(this is always possible at least for local regions); then there exists no gravitational
gradient. The disappearance of the gradient is then called ‘the disappearance of the
gravitational field.’’’ (Reichenbach, 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236; second emphasis
mine).
Reichenbach suggested then that we should distinguish between the tensor as glm
‘‘as a whole or the metrical field’’, ‘‘the particular sets of tensor components’’, in a
certain coordinate system and ‘‘finally the particular set of gradient coefficients of
the tensor components’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236):
In the mathematical representation, the metrical field is given by the tensor glm
the gravitational potential field by the particular set of components glm, and the
gravitational gradient field through the Riemann–Christoffel symbols Cslm,
which are obtained from the
oglm
oxs
. The Cslm do not form a real tensor, only a
linear tensor, and can therefore all at once be transformed to zero by nonlinear
transformations. A fourth concept has occasionally been introduced. We set
glm þ clm, where glm are the normal orthogonal values of the glm, and we refer
to the glm as the inertial field and only to the clm as the gravitational potential
field. The Cslm may then be considered as the derivatives of the clm, since the
glm as constants do not contribute to the gradient field. This resolution
into inertial and gravitational field is an adaptation to the terminology
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of Newtonian mechanics, however, and is therefore hardly appropriate
(Reichenbach 1928, 272; tr. 1958, 237).
This passage is curiously written in smaller characters; Reichenbach’s intention is
simply to introduce some mathematical technicalities. This is revealing of
Reichenbach’s philosophical attitude. From today’s point of view, the passage just
quoted in fact seems to describe the very conceptual core of Einstein’s path to the
theory of general relativity. The conceptual difference between gravitational
‘‘fields’’ and the other ‘‘fields’’ is that the latter, according to Einstein, should be
represented by a non-tensorial, coordinate-dependent quantity, the Christoffel
symbols Cslm. Locally, the phenomena of gravity and acceleration were, in Einstein’s
view, two ways of looking at the same space-time in terms of different coordinate
systems.
Reichenbach is so aware of the importance of this point that he even addresses the
problems which arise following Einstein’s original approach: ‘‘If we change to three-
dimensional polar coordinates, for example, while the time coordinate remains
unchanged, the glm will assume a non-standard from. For these coordinates there must
therefore exist a gravitational field’’, since in polar coordinates ‘‘the partial derivatives
[
oglm
oxs
] do not vanish throughout’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 290, n.; tr. 1958, 253). However,
this is rather counterintuitive since no change in the state of motion is provided by a
mere spatial transformation, which leaves the g44 unchanged (see for instance
Reichenba¨cher 1923). This ‘‘says more than was originally expressed by the principle
of equivalence’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253).
It would therefore be advantageous to express the gravitational field in a
coordinate invariant form (on this point see Eddington, 1923, 39f.): ‘‘all glm-systems
derived from a g0rs-system by means of coordinate transformations are merely
different resolutions of the same tensor into different sets of components. This
tensor, the metrical field, is therefore independent of specific coordinate systems’’
(Reichenbach 1928, 289; tr. 1958, 253). A physical magnitude expressed by a tensor
has definite components once a basis is given in a chosen coordinate system, but
abstractly considered, it stands for its components in all coordinate systems. All
transformable systems should represent the same gravitational field, the presence of
which should be better expressed by the non-vanishing of Riemann–Christoffel
tensor Rlmrs. However, this would mean accepting that ‘‘the consequence that
transformations of the state of motion will not change the gravitational field
either, since they too leave the metrical field invariant’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 291; tr.
1958, 254). In this way the ‘‘principle of equivalence’’ (that is, the possibility of
interpreting locally an acceleration field as gravitational field) would become
useless.
6.2 Co-Variant and Invariant
As Reichenbach notices in the popular book Von Kopernikus bis Einstein. Der
Wandel unseres Weltbildes (Reichenbach 1927), all of this can be understood
precisely because Einstein ‘‘had to introduce in physics a new mathematical
The Forgotten Tradition 1245
123
Author's personal copy
method, the so-called tensor calculus’’. ‘‘The essence of the new method of
calculation resides in two basic concepts, the invariant and the co-variant’’
(Reichenbach 1927, 105). In particular Reichenbach suggests interpreting the
gravitational field as a covariant magnitude, which depends on the coordinate
system, andthe metric field as an invariant magnitude:
This consideration leads to a distinction which we have touched upon several
times before and which expresses a basic idea of modern science. The system
of the tensor components is covariant, i.e. it has a different numerical
composition for each coordinate system. Yet we express in this fashion a state
that is independent of the coordinate system, i.e., an invariant state. The tensor
as a whole is an invariant magnitude. We can recognize this property from its
representation by means of components, since the components can be
calculated for every coordinate system, if they are known for one. It is
unfortunate that the physical terminology does not reflect this well-defined
mathematical distinction. By ‘‘gravitational field’’ we understand the system
of components of the tensor in each case; this makes the gravitational field a
covariant magnitude. No particular term has been accepted for the invariant
tensor field as a whole. It might best be called the metrical field, in accordance
with some ideas which we shall discuss later; in fact, this term has
occasionally been used with this meaning. In this terminology the gravitational
field is the particular system of components into which the metrical field has
been resolved (Reichenbach 1928, 271; tr. 1958, 236).
Reichenbach’s terminology is surely non-standard. As we have seen, Reichenbach
himself notices that the gravitational field is represented by the Christoffel symbols,
that is, by a non-tensorial, i.e. non-covariant quantity (cf. above p. 12). However, the
point Reichenbach wants to make is clear enough: The values of the components glm
depend on a particular coordinate system, they are covariant quantities. However,
regardless of the coordinate system used, the lengths of lines are assigned the same
value, that is, the length between a pair of space-time points is an invariant quantity.
According to Reichenbach, ‘‘[t]he coordinate systems themselves are not
equivalent’’, in the sense that in every system a different set of tensor components
glm is defined; however, ‘‘every coordinate system with its corresponding
gravitational field is equivalent to any other coordinate system together with its
corresponding gravitational field’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 272; tr. 1958, 237). The
ensemble of all inter-transformable glm-systems represent the same metric field and
thus the same geometry of space-time: ‘‘Each of these covariant descriptions is an
admissible representation of the invariant state of the world’’ (Reichenbach 1928,
272; tr. 1958, 237). Similarly, an electromagnetic field as a whole transforms as a
tensor, but not the electric and the magnetic field separately: an electric field for one
observer could be a superposition of an electric and a magnetic field for the other.
Surprisingly, from Reichenbach’s semi-technical presentation of the general
theory of relativity one learns that ‘‘the gravitational field is deprived of its absolute
character and recognized as a covariant magnitude’’ (Reichenbach 1928, 248; tr.
1958, 214), that is, (in Reichenbach’s parlance) a coordinate-dependent magnitude,
represented by Cslm. In a flat Minkowski space-time, an ‘‘artificial’’ gravitational
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field can be introduced by a mere coordinate transformation. On the other hand, the
geometry of space-time has an absolute character in the sense that it is coordinate
independent, it does not change if one represents it in different coordinate systems;
for instance, Minkowski space-time is flat, which means that the Riemann tensor
Rlmrs vanishes everywhere regardless of the coordinate system used.
Following the more expository parts of Reichenbach’s book one discovers that
there is indeed a conventional element in the general theory of relativity; however,
this is not the geometry, but rather the gravitational field. The same space-time
geometry, which in one coordinate system has only an inertial component, in
another it has both an inertial and a gravitational component. Since the Christoffel-
symbols are not tensors, if they have zero components, that is, only inertial
components in one coordinate system, there exists a coordinate system in which the
components are non-zero and a gravitational field appears.
The consequence is that the distinction between inertia and gravitation is a
mathematical artifact which depends on the choice of the coordinates and therefore
does not reflect a real physical difference: only the sum of the two pieces represents
something physical. Following this line of thought, which has somehow remained
hidden behind the curtains of Reichenbach’s ‘‘official’’ philosophy, one discovers
that the core of Einstein’s original approach should not be found in the discovery of
the relativity of geometry, but rather in the discovery of relativity of the
gravitational field (Janssen 2005).
6.3 ‘‘Displacement Space’’ Versus ‘‘Metrical Space’’
From this point of view, Reichenbach’s idea that the gravitational force has to be set
equal to zero is at least ambiguous (Torretti, 1983, 237). The best way to understand
the fact that gravity is a ‘‘universal force’’ is precisely to recognize that the
gravitational field is not a tensor field on the manifold, whereas the potential field is.
This point, however, gets completely lost using the conceptual resources of the
Helmholtz and Poincare´ debate on the foundation of geometry. The non-geometrical
work of Christoffel and Ricci furnished Einstein the analytical tools to express this
distinctive feature of the gravitational field. As we have mentioned (p. 3.3), a
geometrical reinterpretation of this mathematical apparatus was developed only
after general relativity, in particular through Levi-Civita’s notion of parallel
displacement of a vector.
Reichenbach, however, always considered the discovery of ‘‘the independence of
the displacement operation [Verschiebungsoperation] … given by the Cslm from the
metric… given by the glm’’ (Reichenbach 1929b, 683) as philosophically irrelevant.
The quantities Cslm cannot be measured directly by rods and clocks, but must be
obtained from the directly measured quantities glm by calculation: they are a
‘‘product of fantasy, mere illustration’’ (Reichenbach, 1928, 352; on this point see
Coffa 1979). Also, much later works of Reichenbach’s (Reichenbach 1949;
Reichenbach 1951) do not show any sign of ‘‘resipiscence’’.
From today’s point of view, however, lurking here is the crucial point of
Einstein’s original approach. Contrary to modern relativists (Synge 1960, VIIIf.;
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Synge 1970, 158; Ohanian 1977; see Lehmkuhl 2008), Einstein insisted until the
end of his life that ‘‘what characterizes the existence of a gravitational field… is the
non-vanishing of the Clik, not the non-vanishing of the Riklm’’ (Einstein to Max von
Laue, September 1950; translated in Stachel 1986, 1858). As he points out in one of
his last letters to Michele Besso in 1954, ‘‘[t]his was still not so clear at the time of
the setting up of the G.R., but was subsequently recognized principally through
Levi- Civita’’, who ‘‘provided the possibility of defining the ‘displacement field’
Clik’’, which ‘‘is in-itself independent from the existence of a metric field gik’’
(Einstein 1972, 525–527; partially translated in Norton 2002, see also Einstein 1956,
141).
The vanishing of Christoffel symbols does not mean that there is no gravitational/
displacement field (Giulini 2001, § 9). A gravitational field can always be
introduced, even in a flat Minkowski space-time, by a simple change in coordinates.
Thus, the flat metric of space-time can be regarded as a special case of a
gravitational field, rather than the absence of a gravitational field (see also Einstein
to Becquerol, August 16, 1951, cited by Norton 1985). This seems to be in harmony
with Einstein’s famous claim that there is no ‘‘space without a field’’. If we imagine
the gravitational field to be removed, there remains ‘‘absolutely nothing, and also no
‘topological space’’’ (Einstein 1952, 155).
7 Conclusion. Over-Determination Versus Under-Determination
Reichenbach’s idea that ‘‘the topology of space is to be regarded as a more
fundamental determination than the metric’’ (Reichenbach, 1929a, 30; tr. 1978, I, 183)
seems to derive from the observation that the metric relations, the lengths of
worldlines, do not remain invariant under an arbitrary deformation of space-time
(induced for instance by a universal force). Such a deformation would preserve only
the smoothness of the coordinate system and the uniqueness of the labeling of the
points, depriving the coordinate system of all but its topological properties.
However, distances do remain invariant under a transformation which represents
a mere recoordinization, that is, under the condition that the coefficients of the
quadratic form also change. This is exactly the relevant point. The geometry of a
given space-time is characterized by the invariant interval between any two world-
points; once a unit of measure has be chosen, the numerical value of this interval
remains unchanged under coordinate transformations.
What is relevant in general relativity, as Reichenbach showed in his 1920 book,
is precisely the ‘‘relativity of coordinates’’ and not the ‘‘relativity of geometry’’ that
appears in his mature philosophy: ‘‘The relativity of geometry is a consequence
of the fact that different geometries can be represented by one another with a
one-to-one correspondence’’ (Reichenbach 1949, 298). The relativity of coordinates
is due to the fact that the same geometry can be represented in different coordinate
systems.
As we have tried to show, the origin of Reichenbach’s ‘‘conversion’’ can be
regarded as the result of a ‘‘collision’’ of mathematical traditions (analogous,
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although not perfectly identical, to that denounced in Norton 1999). Instead of
following the Riemann–Christoffel–Ricci–Einstein line, as he seemed to do in his
first monograph, Reichenbach, probably under the influence of Schlick, tried to
create the tradition Riemann-Helmholtz-Poincare´-Einstein:
The solution to the problem of space described here is to be attributed
principally to the work of Riemann, Helmholtz, Poincare´, and Einstein,
Helmholtz, the first to acknowledge the significance of Riemann’s idea for
physics, indisputably deserves the major credit for the recognition of the
definitional character of congruence in physical space. Poincare´ coined
the term conventionalism, which refers to the definitional character of the
congruence of line segments and designated the definition in question as a
convention. At the time he introduced this idea, Poincare´ still believed that the
convention of the rigid body led to Euclidean geometry, not knowing that
Einstein was soon to take up the idea of conventionalism in all seriousness and
apply non-Euclidean geometry to physics, final clarification came about with
the philosophical discussion of Einstein’s general theory of relativity
(Reichenbach 1929a, 60; tr. Reichenbach, 1978, 179)
As recent literature has abundantly shown, general relativity cannot be the heir of this
philosophical/mathematical tradition simply because such a tradition does not exist.
Poincare´ explicitly excluded the Riemanniann geometries of variable curvature from
his conventionalism, precisely because they were at odds with the Helmholtzian
approach based on the existence of rigid bodies. As we have tried to point out,
Riemann’s geometrical approach to geometry actually remained dormant and
developed instead in a non-geometrical tradition, the main protagonists of which
are arguably Christoffel and Ricci. The geometrical implications of the calculus were
developed mainly after the emergence of general relativity by Levi-Civita and others.
A much more plausible line of development of Riemann’s work in the 19th
century is, for instance, that which was suggested by Cartan in a non-technical paper
of 1931:
Euclidean geometry itself also uses analytic methods relying on the use of
coordinates, but these coordinates (Cartesian, rectangular, polar, etc.) have a
precise, quantitative geometric significance, which is why they can be introduced
only after the geometry is founded by its own methods. In Riemannian geometry,
on the contrary, coordinates, introduced from the beginning, serve simply to
relate empirically the different points of space, and geometry has precisely the
object of extricating the geometric properties that are independent of this
arbitrary choice of coordinates. … The necessity of using systems of arbitrary
coordinates exerted a profound influence on the later development of mathe-
matics and physics. It led to the admirable creation of an absolute differential
calculus by Ricci and Levi-Civita, which was the instrument that helped to
elaborate general relativity (Cartan, 1931, 397f.; tr. Pesic 2007, 182).
We are dealing with two mathematical traditions that seem to be interested in
different philosophical problems. Helmholtz and Poincare´ tried to determine the
condition under which it is possible to make a choice among alternative physical
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geometries that share some weaker mathematical structure. In contrast, Riemann
raised the problem of distinguishing the intrinsic features of a given physical
geometry from the apparent differences introduced by the choice of a particular
coordinate system.
There is a broader philosophical lesson we can take away from the historical
reconstruction outlined above. Considered in the light of the 19th century
philosophy of geometry, the logical empiricists could interpret general relativity
as a case of mathematical undertermination: the relevant geometric structure that
General Relativity has at its disposal (what the Logical Empiricist call the
‘‘topological’’ structure) is not ‘‘rich enough’’ to allow a choice among different
possible physical geometries. Considered under the historical perspective we have
suggested, the requirement of general covariance, if it is not to be considered trivial,
seems to raise instead a problem of mathematical overdetermination; that is, the
physical system is described by a surplus of mathematical structure (Norton 2003;
more in general on this topic Redhead, 2001).
The logical empiricists’ strategy was to introduce some redundant physical
elements (the universal forces) in order to extract the mathematically relevant content
of the theory. From a contemporary perspective, on the contrary, general relativity
seems instead to introduce redundant mathematical structure in order to extract the
physically relevant content of the theory as the invariant content (Giulini 2007).
Einstein’s notorious ‘‘hole argument’’, Hilbert’s version of the argument in terms
of Cauchy initial conditions (Stachel 1992), are precisely the consequence of the
existence of mathematical degrees of freedom that do not have any correspondence
in physical reality. The covariance of Einstein’s equations leaves undetermined the
evolution of four out of the ten components of glm. Instead of being a trivial
consequence of the application of the ‘‘absolute differential calculus’’ as in the
‘‘Kretschmann objection’’, such a ‘‘redundancy’’ in mathematical formalism appears
rather to be one of the main philosophical issues raised by general relativity
(Norton, 2003).
Historically, this problem was ‘‘rediscovered’’ in the late 1950’s by Peter
Bergmann (Bergmann 1956; Bergmann 1961b; Bergmann and Komar 1960;
Bergmann 1961a), Einstein’s assistant at Princeton, who was led to again discuss
the question of what is observable in general relativity. From this vantage point, the
Logical Empiricists’ idea that the metric is not an ‘‘observable’’, whereas the
neighborhood relations encoded in the coordinate system are, appears then to be
utterly inadequate in grasping the relevant philosophical issue; general relativity
shows instead that, because of ‘‘the mathematical ambiguity of the coordinate
system’’ (Bergmann 1956, 491), the values of the metric at a particular world-point
are not an observable (Bergmann 1961b, § 27; Bergmann, 1968, § 27).
While Reichenbach continued to insist in his last writings that the main
philosophical issue of Einstein’s general theory was the existence of a ‘‘class of
equivalent descriptions’’ (Reichenbach, 1951, 133) of different physical situations,
after Reichenbach’s death it became clear that the real problem in General
Relativity is that, as Bergmann put it, there is an ‘‘equivalence class of solutions’’
that describes the ‘‘same physical situation’’ (Bergmann 1961b, 511). Only the
equivalence class is physically real.
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